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CRIMINAL LAW CASE NOTES
the serious threat of imprisonment will dis-
sipate any intellectual craving for such drugs.
The proposals for amendment of the uniform
acts and revision of commitment provisions are
suggested as alternatives to the adoption of a
more liberal attitude toward legalized maintenance
of opiate drugs. However the dangerous drug
legislation, and the proposals for regulation of
hallucinogenic drugs, are suggested as necessarily
exclusive of the approach taken to opiate addic-
tion, which is a distinct phenomenon.
The law dealing with opiate addiction and
dangerous drug abuse is seriously in need of
revision. This article was submitted in the hope
that careful consideration will be given to the
facts of the drug problem and the various al-
ternative approaches which have been suggested
for handling it, in order that the amendment of
old legislation and the enactment of new will
result in a just and effective system of dealing
with that problem.
Case Notes
Case Notes are prepared by the journal's Student Editorial Board. An editorial comment accom-
panying a Note represents the opinion of the student who prepared the Note and does not necessarily
represent the viewpoint of any other member of the Editorial Board.
Trial Court's Comment Reflecting On Veracity
Of Prosecution Witness Held To Be Reversible
Error-Dunfee v. State, 412 S.W.2d 614 (Ark.
1967). Defendants were convicted of assault with
intent to kill for wounding one O'Neal during an
argument over hunting rights on a certain tract
of land. Defendants assigned as error the trial
court's comment that everyone on the witness
stand is presumed to tell the truth. This comment
was made after defense counsel asked a prosecu-
tion witness, "You had that pretty well memorized,
didn't you?"
The Supreme Court of Arkansas held that the
words of the court were prejudicial error in viola-
tion of article 7, §23 of the state constitution which
provided that, "Judges shall not charge juries
with regard to matters of fact ... ." The court
pointed out that from his authoritative position
the trial judge was able to influence the jury in
their decision and thus should take great care in
choosing words or conduct which would support
or destroy the testimony of any witness.
Government Vouching For The Credibility Of
Witnesses As Reversible Error-Gradsky v.
United States, 373 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1967). The
defendant was convicted of mail fraud, fraud in
the sale of securities, and conspiracy. Much of the
strength of the government's case rested upon the
credibility of two government witnesses, alleged
co-conspirators who testified as to the defendant's
activities. The prosecutor in his argument to the
jury stated that the government vouched for the
credibility of the two witnesses, that "the govern-
ment representatives don't put a witness on the
stand unless there appears to be some credibility,
until he appears to be a truthful witness," and that
"the government has every opportunity to check
out and to judge the credibility and truthfulness:
of the witnesses and "in that context" offered their
testimony. The defendant appealed from the denial
of a motion for a mistrial following the prosecutor's
statement.
The Court of Appeals reversed. Applying the
test of whether the prosecutor's statement might
reasonably lead the jury to believe that other
evidence existed, unknown or unavailable to the
jury, on which the prosecutor was convinced of the
defendant's guilt, the court held that the prose-
cutor's statementf was highly prejudicial error,
since the language could only be construed to imply
that the government had "run a check" on the two
witnesses and on the" basis of that check, the re-
suits of which were out of the reach of the jury,
had concluded that the witnesses were truthful.
Invited Error Doctrine Is Not Unlimited-
State v. Smith 420 P.2d 278 (Ariz. 1966). The de-
fendant was convicted of first degree robbery. At
the trial the defense counsel noted defendant's
failure to testify and explained the reasons other
than guilt for so doing. In the state's closing argu-
ment, the prosecuting attorney referred to the
defense counsel's statements and said:
[If the defendant had taken the stand] he
would be asked about anything... in the
past, any trouble he had been in, any convic-
tion he may have had, and certainly if he had
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been in trouble before, he wouldn't want to
take the stand.
The defendant had not objected to this state-
ment at the trial but the Supreme Court of Arizona
held that there had not been a waiver of the right
to claim error and reversed the conviction.
The court held that while it is true that the
"invited error"
doctrine provides that where remarks of the
prosecuting attorney, even though improper,
are invited or occasioned by accused's counsel,
... they are generally not grounds for re-
versal.*** But the remarks of the prosecuting
attorney [here] went far beyond the com-
ments of the defense attorney....
The court concluded that as a result of the in-
nuendos raised by the prosecution, the defendant
had been deprived of his constitutional right to
remain silent.
Substitution Of Alternative Juror After Com-
mencement Of Jury Deliberation-People v. Ryan,
224 N.E.2d 710 (N.Y. 1966). Defendants were
charged with robbery and assault in the second
degree and tried on those charges. Five hours after
the jury began deliberating one of the jurors be-
came ill and an alternate juror, who had been in
the sheriff's custody and had not theretofore been
involved in the deliberation, was substituted with
the consent of defendant's counsel. This was con-
sistent with section 358-a of the New York Code
of Criminal Procedure which provides that:
After final submission of a case, the court
may discharge the Alternate Jurors, or if the
court deem it advisable he may direct that one
or more of the Alternate Jurors be kept in the
custody of the sheriff or one or more court
officers, separate and apart from the regular
jurors until the jury have agreed upon a ver-
dict. If after final submission of the case and
before the jury have agreed upon a verdict, a
juror die or become ill, or for any other reason
he be unable to perform his duty, the court
may order him to be discharged and draw the
name of an alternate, who shall then take his
place....
Defendant was convicted and on appeal con-
tended that substitution in this case violated his
constitutional right to trial by jury.
The conviction was reversed by the Court of
Appeals, two judges dissenting. The majority
stated that in order to give the defendant's right
to trial by jury meaning there must be a full
opportunity for twelve jurors to deliberate the
merits of the case, exchanging views, and finally
coming to a decision. In this instance such a
procedure was impossible.
First, the twelve original jurors had already
sifted the evidence and, in all probability, had
formulated their preliminary positions when the
alternate juror entered the proceedings. They
would, therefore, not have the advantage of the
alternate juror's ideas, nor he, theirs. "If delibera-
tions had progressed to a stage where the original
eleven were in substantial agreement," the court
said, "they were in a position to present a formida-
ble obstacle to the alternate juror's attempts to
persuade and convince the eleven remaining origi-
nal jurors." Furthermore, if this procedure were
allowed, there would, in effect, be thirteen people
participating in the deliberations. The State
constitution, however, only authorized a common
law jury of twelve. The court also found that
consent given by the defendant's attorney was
insufficient where under state law waiver of jury
trial may be made only "by a written statement
signed by the defendant in open court and with
the approval of the judge.. .. "
Refusal To Testify And Freedom Of Religion-
In Re Williams, 152 S.E.2d 317 (N.C. 1967).
Defendant, a Baptist minister, was subpoenaed,
by both the prosecutrix and the accused, to testify
at a trial in which the accused was charged with
rape. The defendant refused to be sworn or to take
the stand. He based his refusal on the fact that
members of his parish were involved in both sides
of the trial, and any confidential communications
between himself and his parishioners were privi-
leged. The trial judge agreed that although the
confidential communications between the minister
and those of his flock on trial were privileged, the
clergyman's knowledge gained from other sources
was not privileged. Reverend Williams replied
that he refused to take the stand under any circum-
stances, since he felt that "taking sides" in the
case would be a breach of his professional duty.
The defendant was summarily adjudged in con-
tempt of court and was sentenced to ten days in
jail.
On appeal, the defendant contended, inter alia,
that any knowledge he had regarding the circum-
stances surrounding the rape was acquired in his
professional capacity, and to force him to reveal
Vol. 58
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this information was a violation of his first amend'
ment right to the free exercise of his religion.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina, in
affirming the contempt conviction, prefaced its
opinion by noting that the right to the free exercise
of religion granted in the first amendment did
not provide immunity for every act which
one's conscience permits him to do, or even
for every act which one's conscience classifies
as required by ethics, nor [does it] shield the
defendant from a command by the State that
he do an act merely because he believes it
morally or ethically wrong.
The court then reasoned that if a clergyman was
protected from being forced to testify because he
feels that to do so would contravene his religious*
duty, then a layman having such a belief would
also be protected. Such a consequence would in-
tolerably deprive the court of testimony needed to
administer justice.
The court said that the free exercise of religion
is necessarily impaired by government compulsion
that one act against his religious belief. However,
the government acts only when there is a compel-
ling state interest. The court concluded that the
effective operation of the courts of justice of a
state is a compelling state interest, and hence, the
state could order Reverend Williams to testify.
In Re Jenison Contempt Proceedings, 120 N.W.2d
515 (Minn. 1963), was distinguished by the court,
in that it involved a prospective juror who refused
to serve on religious grounds. The court felt that
obtaining competent jurors was not an interest
sufficient to override one's religious beliefs.
Permissible Regulation Of News Gathering In
The Interest Of A Fair Trial-Seymour v. United
States, 373 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1967). The defendant,
a television news photographer, was found guilty
of criminal contempt and fined for violating a
standing order of the court which prohibited the
taking of photographs "in connection with any
judicial proceeding.., upon the same floor of the
building upon which the courtrooms are located."
On appeal, the defendant contended that the
order was an unconstitutional prior restraint upon
the first amendment freedom of the press. The
Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the order
"falls within the ambit of permissible maintenance
of judicial decorum and represents a reasonable
implementation of the due process mandate to
preserve at all costs an atmosphere essential to...
a fair trial." The court reasoned that even assum-
ing that the first amendment protections from
unreasonable restraints upon the dissemination of
news information extended to the gathering of
such information, such a right to gather news was
not unconditional.
Ordinance Pertaining To Solicitation By A
Prostitute Held Void For Vagueness-City of
Detroit v. Bowden, 149 N.W.2d 771 (Mich., Ct.
of App. 1967). Defendant was convicted of violat-
ing an ordinance making it unlawful for a known
prostitute to "repeatedly stop or attempt to stop
any pedestrian or motor vehicle by hailing,- whis-
fling, waving of arms or any other bodily gesture,
while such person is on any public sidewalk or
street.... ." A known prostitute was defined as
"anyone who, within two years of arrest for viola-
tion of this section, has been convicted of prostitu-
tion or related crimes." The court reversed the
conviction holding the ordinance invalid for
vagueness, for denial of due process, and for viola-
tion of the privilege against self-incrimination.
The court stated that the ordinance was so vague
that it made criminal an innocent act, holding that
"it makes it criminal for a person, once convicted
of [prostitution] to hail a taxi, greet a friend, or do
any one of a multitude of innocent, legal acts."
The court based its holding first on the principle
that a person must be able to prepare a defense
against a charge and that the ordinance in the
present case is so vague that such a defense could
not be formulated. Secondly, it stated that the
ordinance creates an invalid presumption of guilt
in that once the state has produced evidence that
the defendant was seen doing the act the ordinance
proscribes and that she is a known prostitute
"she is more than presumed guilty of violating the
ordinance. She is guilty." In relation to this point
the court said that there is no rational connection
between the act performed and the charge of
soliciting. The ordinance has the effect of shifting
the burden of proof to the defendant and stripping
her of a defense merely because of her prior con-
viction. Finally, the court stated that the ordinance
violates the privilege against self-incrimination in
that, by making the defendant rebut the presump-
tion of guilt, she has lost her right to'remain silent.
The Admissibility Of Business Records-Carroll
v. Houtz, 225 A.2d 584 (New Jersey 1966). This
was an action for wrongful death brought by the
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administratrix ad prosequenduni of the deceased's
cstatc. After deceased's death an autopsy was
performed by two assistant county physicians.
Thcre was a state requirement that a toxicological
analysis of the deceased's blood and brain tissues
be made. The hospital at which the autopsy was
conducted had no facilities to make the required
analysis so the specimens were sent to an outside
laboratory for analysis. This outside analysis was
made part of the autopsy report. The outside re-
port was admitted into evidence over the objection
of the administratrix. A judgment was awarded to
the defendant. The administratrix appealed
contending that the admission of the outside report
violated the hearsay rule.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed the
judgment holding that the report made by the
outside laboratory and made part of the autopsy
file fell within the ambit of the Uniform Business
Records As Evidence Act, as enacted in New
Jersey:
A record of an act, condition or event, shall,
insofar as relevant, be competent evidence if
the custodian or other qualified witness testi-
fies to its identity and the mode of its prep-
aration, and if it was made in the regular
course of business, at or near the time of the
act, condition or event, and if, in the opinion
of the court, the sources of information,
method and time of preparation were such
as to justify its admission.
The outside laboratory's report are included in
the category of hospital and medical records.
Therefore, when properly authenticated these
records are admissible into evidence.
Expansion Of The Rights Of The Indigent-
People v. Watson 221 N.E.2d 645 (Ill. 1966); and
People v. Miller 221 N.E.2d 653 (Ill. 1966). The
Supreme Court of Illinois, heeding the admonition
of the Supreme Court of the United States that
"there can be no equal justice where the kind of a
trial a man gets depends on the amount of money
he has", Griffin. v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12,19 (1956),
has held that the state must pay for expert wit-
nesses and must provide free transcripts of prior
proceedings for some indigent dependants.
In the Vatson case, the defendant had been
convicted of attempted forgery of a travelers
check. The defendant contended in the trial court
that a handwriting expert could prove that it was
not his signature on the check and requested the
court to appoint an expert and have the state pay
his fee. The trial judge refused and the supreme
court found this to be reversible error.
The court reasoned that while the Illinois
legislature had seen fit to restrict the payment by
the state of expert witnesses to capital trials of
indigents, there was no less a constitutional
deprivation of equal protection in a non-capital
case. The court rejected the state's contention that
the ordinary subpoena rights of an accused were
sufficient since an "appearance itself [of the expert]
would be of no value unless he had been able to
make findings upon which to base his testimony".
It was the expenses in connection with the pre-
trial preparation, the court said, which the state
should be required to pay to insure that the trial
testimony of the expert was adequate.
In the Miller case, the defendant had been
convicted of armed robbery after having had two
mistrials. It was contended by the defendant that
certain testimony in the two mistrials was in
conflict and also conflicted with the testimony
given at the final trial. The defendant requested
the trial court to order the state to provide free
transcripts of the mistrials to be used to impeach
the witnesses. The trial court refused and the
Supreme Court of Illinois reversed.
The court agreed with the defendant that the
Griffin case, which only required the state to
provide trial transcripts for indigents for appeal,
should not be read narrowly but rather its mean-
ing, if not its language, was meant to include the
present situation if the courts are to give "the
defendant ... the equal protection of the laws and
the same fair trial which a defendant with funds
would have obtained".
What Is Obscene?-United States v. One Carton
Positive Aotion Picture Film Entitled "491", 367
F.2d 889 (2d Cir. 1966). Janus Films, Inc. had
attempted to import the Swedish film "491",
which depicted the lives of several juvenile de-
linquents and their housefather in rather vivid
sexual detail. The title of the film was taken from
a Biblical commandment to forgive sin "seven
times seventy" and the actions of the boys were
equated with the 491st sin.
When the film arrived in New York it was given
a screening by the Collector of Customs and de-
termined to be obscene. Thereafter, the Attorney
General filed suit in the federal district court to
have the film forfeited. The district court found the
Vol. 58
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film obscene and ordered its forfeiture. (247
F.Supp. 450.) Janus Films appealed and the Court
of Appeals in a 2-1 decision reversed.
The court stated that if
"491" is viewed solely as an exhibition on the
screen of sexual acts (1) sodomy (buggery);
(2) intercourse with a prostitute; (3) a homo-
sexual act; (4) intercourse between the prosti-
tute and a dog; and (5) of self-mutilation,
then the picture might well be characterized
as "utterly without redeeming social signifi-
cance".
The court makes a seemingly futile effort at really
deciding whether the film is beyond community
standards, or appeals to the prurient interest, or
even what segment of the population's prurient
interest is relevant, although Judge Waterman in
a concurring opinion states:
It is inconceivable to me that a film so de-
grading of human dignity and so brutally
animalistic and which negates in every par-
ticular the mores of our civilization could
possibly appeal to the prurience of any aver-
age American.
The real issue upon which the court held the film
not to be obscene was its redeeming social value as
a sociological study of delinquents. The court
cited the numerous witnesses presented for each
side as to the social value of the film and said that
"a fair appraisal of their testimony and the picture
as a whole require the conclusion of at least [a]
"minimal value". Judge Waterman in his concur-
ring opinion stated:
The film cannot truthfully be said to be
utterly without redeeming social importance.
It attacks broadside the Christian ethos, it
-exemplifies the worthlessness of humans de-
void of innate spiritual resources.... Is it
not socially important to have one's notions of
the good, the pure, and the beautiful subject to
analyses, even if the analyses are in poor
taste, objectionably set forth, and Karate-
administered?
Presumption Overturned In Gun Case-State v.
Lewis, 255 A.2d 582 (N.J., Super. Ct., App. Div.
1966). The defendant was convicted of carrying a
concealed weapon when police officers searched the
car in which he had been riding (in the back seat)
and discovered a gun in the pocket of a jacket on
the front seat. There was no proof that the jacket
or the gun belonged to the defendant, but a New
Jersey statute provided that "The presence of a
firearm... in a vehicle is presumptive evidence of
possession by all persons occupying the vehicle at
the time."
The Appellate Court reversed the conviction
holding that even assuming that the statutory
presumption was constitutional "as applied to
appropriate facts, we think it would be an uncon-
stitutional construction to hold that under it the
mere unexplained presence of a gun concealed in a
coat worn by or belonging to one passenger justifies
the conviction of another passenger of unlawful
possession."
Arrest-People v. Garay, 56 Cal. Rpt. 55 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1967). The defendant was convicted of
stealing two wristwatches. The police were alerted
to the defendant's possible shoplifting activities
by the manager of the hotel where defendant lived.
The hotel manager had observed numerous items
of tagged clothing in defendant's room. The police
staked out the hotel and frequently observed him
leaving the hotel empty handed and returning to
his room with his coat bulging and his hands in his
pockets apparently holding something under his
coat. Just prior to his arrest the defendant was
heard. to say to an accomplice, "look at the shirts
I just stole."
The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction
holding that the arrest was lawful since the officers
had reasonable cause to believe that a felony had
been committed.
Illegal Seizure By Private Policeman Not Viola-
tive Of Fourth Amendment-Wright v. United
States 224 A.2d 475 (Dist. of Col. Ct. App. 1966).
Defendant was convicted of illegal possession of a
sawed-off shotgun. The shotgun had been found
by a plant guard in the defendant's locker at the
factory where he worked. The guard called the
police and asked what he should do about the gun.
The police told him to leave the gun in the locker
but the guard removed it anyway, and took it to
the manager's office. The next morning the guard
turned the gun over to the police who arrested the
defendant. The defendant objected to the admis-
sion of the gun at his trial on the basis that it had
been illegally seized. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the conviction.
The court held that the fourth amendment's
origin and history clearly show that it was
intended as a restraint upon the activities of
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sovereign authority, and was not intended to
be a limitation upon other than governmental
agencies.
Having found that the search and seizure itself
was not violative of the fourth amendment, since
the seizure was by other than a government agent,
the court analogized the admissibility of the gun to
the pre-Mfapp cases involving state seized objects
being admitted in federal prosecutions. Prior to
Mapp r. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the Supreme
Court in Elkins- v. United States, 364 U.S. 206
(1960) had held that evidence which would have
been illegally seized and therefore inadmissible
under federal law, if seized by state authorities
acting independently of federal law enforcement,
was admissible since the fourth amendment did
not apply to state actions. The court here felt that
the reasoning of the Elkins case was equally ap-
plicable to the instant case, since the guard had
acted independently of the police and his seizure
of the gun was not prohibited.
Police Searching For Gas Leak May Seize
Gambling Material-State v. Pnryear, 227 A.2d
139 (N.J., App. Div. 1966). Defendant had been
convicted for unlawfully keeping a place to which
persons may resort for engaging in gambling and
for knowingly possessing lottery slips.
The evidence used against defendant was ob-
tained in the following way: On November 5, 1962
a member of the Newark Bureau of Industrial
Hygiene and Air Pollution Control was assigned to
investigate a complaint that an odor of "coal gas"
was emanating from defendant's apartment. De-
tecting an odor there and not being able to gain
entry, he summoned the police emergency squad.
Three members responded and broke into the
apartment wearing gas masks. They found burning
sulfur candles and further noticed gambling
paraphernalia. They summoned detectives special-
izing in gambling violations. Upon confirmation
that the evidence indeed was gambling material,
the officers seized it and later arrested defendant.
On appeal defendant claimed that admission of
the evidence seized at the apartment was inad-
missible because it was found during a search not
incident to an arrest, pursuant to a search warrant
or with the consent of the owner. He also contended
that the admission of such evidence was contrary
to a municipal ordinance requiring information
obtained by the Air Pollution Bureau to be kept
confidential.
The appellate court, in upholding the second
count of the indictment, (the first was dismissed
on other grounds), and the admission of this
evidence, indicated that there are "exceptional
circumstances" in which, on balancing the need for
effective law enforcement against the right of
privacy, a search warrant can be dispensed with.
Here, it was found, the police officers were acting
in response to an emergency-the threat that
people would be injured by a possible explosion of
the escaping gas-in their official capacity as police
and not as agents for the Bureau of Air Pollution.
The court held, therefore, that the police officers
lawfully entered defendant's apartment, and, upon
discovering gambling paraphernalia in plain view,
had the right and duty to seize it. The court did not
regard the delay brought about by calling in the
detectives as contaminating the evidence seized
since such further inspection by experts could do
nothing but c6nfirm the suspicions of the investi-
gating officers.
Fruit-Of-The-Poisonous-Tree Doctrine-People
v. Stoner, 55 Cal. Rptr. 897 (Cal. 1967). The de-
fendant was convicted of robbery in the first degree.
The prosecution's case rested upon the defendant's
confession to the robbery and the robbery victim's
courtroom identification of the defendant. This
confession was obtained after the defendant was
shown clothes (worn during the robbery) which
the police had illegally seized from his apartment
and after the defendant was identified by the
robbery victim in a lineup where the defendant
was told to wear the illegally seized clothes.
The Supreme Court of California reversed the
conviction on the ground that the admission of the
confession into evidence was error'because it was
the ultimate product of an illegal search and sei-
zure, thus becoming a "fruit of the poisonous tree."
But the court did hold that the fruit of the poi-
sonous tree doctrine is inapplicable to testimony of
a witness to a crime where the identity of the wit-
ness is not learned through any police misconduct.
Although the victim's courtroom identification of
the defendant was partially dependent upon his
viewing of the defendant dressed in the illegally
seized clothes at the lineup, the court held that it
was "sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of
the primary taint" and thus admissible under the
doctrine of Wong Sun v. United State.- 371 U.S.
471 (1963).
Search Of Car In Driveway Incident To Arrest-
United States v. Francolino, 367 F.2d 1013 (2d
Vol. 58
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Cir. 1966). Defendant was convicted of passing
counterfeit money in a department store. The
manager of the store noticed the phony bills and
followed the defendant outside. He observed her
leave in a car and phoned the police giving them
the license number. The police traced the car to
the defendant's home where they arrested her.
The police asked for and were given the keys to
the car by the defendant, whereupon the officers
went out to the car which was parked in front of
the house, opened the trunk and found a quantity
of phony bills bearing the same serial number as
those passed by the defendant in the store. The
state introduced the seized bills at trial over the
defendant's objection. The defendant appealed and
the appellate court affirmed.
The appellate court, in sustaining the conviction,
quoted the case of Agnello v. United States, 269
U.S. 20,30 (1925) which said "that the right of
search incident to an arrest extended not only to
the person but to the place where the arrest is
made... ." The court noted the numerous modem
cases which have consistently upheld this principle
and the wide range of areas which fell under it,
including rooms other than the one the accused is
arrested in. The court, agreeing with the case of
Drummond v. United States, 350 F.2d 983 (8th
Cir. 1965), held that there is "no reason in prin-
ciple why a car parked immediately outside a house
should stand better than a room in it which was
not the place where the defendant was arrested",
and deemed the search in this case permissible. The
court stressed that it felt the proper test of a
search was "whether there was fair basis for belief
that the placed searched-whether inside the
house or immediately outside it-would contain
instruments or fruits of the crime for which the
arrest was made".
Probable Cause Necessary Even When Police
Voluntarily Admitted To Premises-Massachuselts
v. Painten, 368 F.2d 142 (1st Cir. 1966). Defendant,
convicted in a state court on a charge of armed
robbery sought a writ of habeas corpus in the
federal district court.
At the state trial, money and two guns were
introduced into evidence which had been seized
at the apartment of the defendant and his ac-
complice. The police were investigating an armed
robbery in the neighborhood and went to the de-
fendant's without any grounds for suspicion even
remotely amounting to probable cause. The de-
fendant answered the policeman's l-nock at the
door and admitted the police to the apartment.
Upon entering the apartment one of the officers
noted a bulge in the defendant's pocket and found
therein a wad of bills. The officer called to his
partner who had been stationed outside the rear of
the building. The other officer told the officer in
the apartment that a gun had been thrown from
the window which they found on the fire escape
under the window. The defendant objected to the
admission of the gun and the money. Defendant
appealed from an order denying the writ and the
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.
The court distinguished this case from those.in
which it had been said that where the police having
reasonable suspicion, but not probable cause, were
invited to enter premises there was voluntary
consent and any objects seized would be admissible.
Here the court found that the officers had no
grounds at all to suspect the defendant of this
crime and had gone to the apartment solely be-
cause of defendant's past convictions.
Polygraph Licensing Statute Not Unconstitu-
tional-Dovalina v. Albert, 409 S.W.2d 616 (Tex.
CivI. App. 1966). Appellant, a polygraph examiner,
failed a licensing examination and was refused a
license by the Board of Polygraph Examiners. He
sued the Board asking that a writ of mandamus
issue to compel the granting of a license to him or,
in the alternative, to have the court declare the
Texas licensing statute unconstitutional on various
grounds. The trial court refused relief and the
Court of Civil Appeals affirmed.
Appellant first contended that the licensing
statute was invalid under the Texas constitution
because it impaired his obligation under existing -
contracts that he had entered into with employers
before the passage of the act. The court held,
however, that the act did not operate directly
upon appellant's contracts, but instead simply
regulated the business of polygraph examination
with only an incidental effect upon existing con-
tracts. Since the legislature had the power to regu-
late polygraph examinations, the court said, the
statute was constitutional. The court also held that
the act was not void for regulating contracts, even
incidentally, retroactively, since there was nothing
in the record to show that the act, by its terms,
prohibited appellant from recovering for examina-
tions conducted prior to the effective date of the
act.
Appellant also contended that the "grandfather
clause" of the act, licensing existing polygraph
